Abstract
We examine the effect of a market pricing policy designed to attract high-valued traders in a multiple market context using JCAT software. Our experiments show that a simple change to pricing policy can create market performance effects that traditional adaptive trading agents are unable to recognize or capitalize on, but that market-policy-aware trading agents can generally obtain. This suggests as parameterized and tunable markets become more common, trading strategies will increasingly need to be conditional on each individual market’s policies.
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© 2009 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Sohn, Jw., Lee, S., Mullen, T. (2009). Impact of Misalignment of Trading Agent Strategy across Multiple Markets. In: Das, S., Ostrovsky, M., Pennock, D., Szymanksi, B. (eds) Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications. AMMA 2009. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 14. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03821-1_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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