Abstract
Reputation systems are subject to several types of manipulations, often in context of fraud. The current literature offers mainly partial solutions for specific manipulations. However, in practice a reputation system should be robust against all relevant threats. This paper explores the combination of several partial solutions in an evolutionary simulation model. The analysis shows that some partial solutions interfere with each other. In particular, it turns out that there is a crucial tradeoff between sanctioning and rehabilitation of bad behaviour that can be solved by a minimal transaction fee.
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Reitzenstein, I., Peters, R. (2009). Assessing Robustness of Reputation Systems Regarding Interdependent Manipulations. In: Di Noia, T., Buccafurri, F. (eds) E-Commerce and Web Technologies. EC-Web 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5692. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03964-5_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03964-5_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-03963-8
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