Skip to main content

Password Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RSA in the Three-Party Settings

  • Conference paper
Book cover Provable Security (ProvSec 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5848))

Included in the following conference series:

Abstract

A great deal of password authenticated key exchange (PAKE) protocols have been proposed in recent years. Most of them were based on Diffie-Hellman key exchange. While the approach of designing PAKE protocols with RSA is far from maturity and perfection. In fact, the existing PAKE protocols using RSA or other public-key cryptographic techniques provide an authenticated key exchange only between a client and a server. This paper presents a new efficient PAKE protocol using RSA in the three-party settings (3PAKE-RSA). The novel protocol can be resistant to e-residue attack and provably secure under the RSA assumption in the random oracle model.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bellovin, M., Merritt, M.: Encrypted key exchange: Password-based protocols secure against dictionary attacks. In: IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy Oakland, California, USA, pp. 72–84 (1992)

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bellovin, M., Merritt, M.: Augmented encrypted key exchange: A password-based protocol secure against dictionary attacks and password file compromise. In: Proc. of the 1st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 244–250. ACM, New York (1993)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  3. Jablon, D.: Extended password key exchange protocols immune to dictionary attacks. In: Proc.of WET-ICE 1997, pp. 248–255 (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  4. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity authentication and key distribution. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232–249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994)

    Google Scholar 

  5. Halevi, S., Krawczyk, H.: Public-key cryptography and password protocols. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security 2(3), 230–268 (1999)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  6. Bellare, M., Pointcheval, D., Rogaway, P.: Authenticated key exchange secure against dictionary attack. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 139–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. MacKenzie, P., Patel, S., Swaminathan, R.: Password-authenticated key exchange based on RSA. In: Okamoto, T. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1976, pp. 599–613. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Patel, S.: Number theoretic attacks on secure password schemes. In: Proc. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, Oakland, California, May 5–7 (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  9. MuXiang, Z.: New approaches to password authenticated key exchange based on RSA. In: Lee, P.J. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3329, pp. 230–244. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)

    Google Scholar 

  10. MacKenzie, P., Swaminathany, R.: Secure network authentication with password identification. Submission to IEEE P1363a (1999)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Sangjoon, P., Junghyun, N., Seungjoo, K., Dongho, W.: Efficient password-authenticated key exchange based on RSA. In: Abe, M. (ed.) CT-RSA 2007. LNCS, vol. 4377, pp. 309–323. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)

    Google Scholar 

  12. Abdalla, M., Fouque, P., Pointcheval, D.: Password-based authenticated key exchange in the three-party setting. IEE Proc.-Inf. Secur. 153(1), 27–39 (2006)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  13. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Provably secure session key distribution in the three party case. In: 28th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 57–66 (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Gennaro, R., Lindell, Y.: A framework for password-based authenticated key exchange. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 524–542. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  15. Katz, J., Ostrovsky, R., Yung, M.: Efficient password-authenticated key exchange using human-memorable passwords. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 475–494. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. ShuHua, W., YueFei, Z.: Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange with forward-security. Chinese Journal of Computers 30(10), 1833–1841 (2007)

    MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  17. Byun, J.W., Jeong, I.R., Lee, D.H., Park, C.S.: Password-authenticated key exchange between clients with different passwords. In: Deng, R.H., Qing, S., Bao, F., Zhou, J. (eds.) ICICS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2513, pp. 134–146. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Lin, C.L., Sun, H.M., Hwang, T.: Three-party encrypted key exchange: attacks and a solution. ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review 34(4), 12–20 (2000)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  19. Shoup, V.: A computational introduction to number theory and algebra. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2005)

    MATH  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Dongna, E., Cheng, Q., Ma, C. (2009). Password Authenticated Key Exchange Based on RSA in the Three-Party Settings. In: Pieprzyk, J., Zhang, F. (eds) Provable Security. ProvSec 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5848. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04642-1_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04642-1_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04641-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-04642-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics