Abstract
In this paper, we suggest defining obligations under the assumption that agents are responsible. We consider how the framework developed by Horty in [2] can be modified to incorporate this idea, and how this solves some objections raised to Horty’s system. Also, we discuss how the assumption of a responsible world can (not easily) be incorporated into the framework of knowledge based obligations introduced by Pacuit, Parikh and Cogan in [5].
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Olde Loohuis, L. (2009). Obligations in a Responsible World. In: He, X., Horty, J., Pacuit, E. (eds) Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5834. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_20
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-04893-7_20
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-04892-0
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