Abstract
We propose an extension of the standard Dolev-Yao model of cryptographic protocols to facilitate symbolic reasoning about zero-knowledge proofs. This is accomplished by communicating typed terms, and providing a proof amounts to certifying that a term is of a particular type. We present a proof system for term derivability, which is employed to yield a decision procedure for checking whether a given protocol meets its zero knowledge specification.
We thank the anonymous referees for many helpful comments that helped improve the presentation immensely.
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Baskar, A., Ramanujam, R., Suresh, S.P. (2009). A Dolev-Yao Model for Zero Knowledge. In: Datta, A. (eds) Advances in Computer Science - ASIAN 2009. Information Security and Privacy. ASIAN 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5913. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10622-4_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10622-4_11
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