Abstract
Physical Unclonable Functions (\({\emph{PUF}}\)) are physical objects that are unique and unclonable. \({\emph{PUF}}\)s were used in the past to construct authentication protocols secure against physical attackers. However, in this paper we show that known constructions are not fully secure if attackers have raw access to the \({\emph{PUF}}\) for a short period of time. We therefore propose a new, stronger, and more realistic attacker model. Subsequently, we suggest two constructions of authentication protocols, which are secure against physical attackers in the new model and which only need symmetric primitives.
This work was supported by CASED (www.cased.de).
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Pappu, R.: Physical One-Way Functions. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2001)
Pappu, R., Recht, B., Taylor, J., Gershenfeld, N.: Physical one-way functions. Science 297(5589), 2026–2030 (2002)
Gassend, B.: Physical random functions. Master’s thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (2003)
Hammouri, G., Sunar, B.: PUF-HB: A tamper-resilient HB based authentication protocol. In: Bellovin, S.M., Gennaro, R., Keromytis, A.D., Yung, M. (eds.) ACNS 2008. LNCS, vol. 5037, pp. 346–365. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Tuyls, P., et al.: Information-theoretic security analysis of physical uncloneable functions. In: Patrick, A.S., Yung, M. (eds.) FC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3570, pp. 141–155. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Tuyls, P., et al.: Anti-Counterfeiting. In: Security, Privacy and Trust in Modern Data Management, pp. 293–312. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Škorić, B., Tuyls, P.: Strong Authentication with Physical Unclonable Functions. In: Security, Privacy and Trust in Modern Data Management, pp. 133–148. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Guajardo, J., Kumar, S.S., Schrijen, G.J., Tuyls, P.: FPGA intrinsic PUFs and their use for IP protection. In: Paillier, P., Verbauwhede, I. (eds.) CHES 2007. LNCS, vol. 4727, pp. 63–80. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Bloom, B.H.: Space/time trade-offs in hash coding with allowable errors. Communications of the ACM 13(7), 422–426 (1970)
Broder, A., Mitzenmacher, M.: Network applications of bloom filters: A survey. Internet Mathematics 1(4), 485–509 (2004)
Merkle, R.C.: Protocols for public key cryptosystems. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 122 (1980)
Guajardo, J., Škorić, B., Tuyls, P., Kumar, S.S., Bel, T., Blom, A.H., Schrijen, G.J.: Anti-counterfeiting, key distribution, and key storage in an ambient world via physical unclonable functions. Information Systems Frontiers 11(1), 19–41 (2009)
Dodis, Y., Reyzin, L., Smith, A.: Fuzzy extractors: How to generate strong keys from biometrics and other noisy data. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 523–540. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Škorić, B., Tuyls, P.: Robust key extraction from physical unclonable functions. In: Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A.D., Yung, M. (eds.) ACNS 2005. LNCS, vol. 3531, pp. 407–422. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Mitzenmacher, M., Upfal, E.: Probability and Computing: Randomized Algorithms and Probabilistic Analysis. Cambridge University Press, New York (2005)
Micali, S., Reyzin, L.: Min-round resettable zero knowledge in the public key model. In: Preneel, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2000. LNCS, vol. 1807, pp. 373–393. Springer, Heidelberg (2000)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Busch, H., Katzenbeisser, S., Baecher, P. (2009). PUF-Based Authentication Protocols – Revisited. In: Youm, H.Y., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5932. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10838-9_22
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10838-9_22
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10837-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10838-9
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)