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Proceedings

Volume Editor

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Preface

This volume contains the papers presented at WINE 2009: the 5th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics held December 14–18, 2009, in Rome, at the Department of Computer and System Sciences, Sapienza University of Rome.

Over the past decade there has been growing interaction between researchers in theoretical computer science, networking and security, economics, mathematics, sociology, and management sciences devoted to the analysis of problems arising in the Internet and the worldwide web. The Workshop on Internet and Network Economics (WINE) is an interdisciplinary forum for the exchange of ideas and results arising in these varied fields.

There were 142 submissions to the workshop including regular and short papers. All submissions were rigorously peer reviewed and evaluated on the basis of the quality of their contribution, originality, soundness, and significance. Almost all submissions were reviewed by at least three Program Committee members. The committee decided to accept 34 regular papers and 29 short papers. The Best Student Paper award sponsored by Google Inc. was given to Saeed Alaei and Azarakhsh Malekian for the paper “An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction.”

The program also included three invited talks by S. Muthukrishnan (Google Inc. and Rutgers University), H. Peyton Young (Oxford and Johns Hopkins University) and Eva Tardos (Cornell University). Three tutorials were also offered on the days before the workshop, from Andrei Broder (Yahoo! Research) on Computational Advertising, Nikhil Devanur and Kamal Jain (Microsoft Research) on Computational Issues in Market Equilibria, and Tim Roughgarden (Stanford University) on Bayesian and Worst-Case Revenue Maximization.

We would like to thank Google Inc., Microsoft Research, Yahoo! Research, Fondazione Ugo Bordoni and Sapienza University of Rome for the generous financial support to WINE 2009. We would also like to thank the Department of Computer and System Sciences, Sapienza University of Rome, for hosting the event. Vincenzo Bonifaci and Piotr Sankowski offered their precious help for the review process, the conference website and the workshop proceedings. We also acknowledge Easychair, a fantastic, robust, easy to use, freely available system for managing the work of the Program Committee and the production of workshop proceedings.

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