Abstract
In this paper we study the Nash-equilibrium and equilibrium bidding strategies of the Pooled Reverse Auction for troubled assets. The auction was described in (Ausubel & Cramton 2008[1]). We further extend our analysis to a more general class of games which we call Summation Games. We prove the existence and uniqueness of a Nash-equilibrium in these games when the utility functions satisfy a certain condition. We also give an efficient way to compute the Nash-equilibrium of these games. We show that then Nash-equilibrium of these games can be computed using an ascending auction. The aforementioned reverse auction can be expressed as a special instance of such a game. We also, show that even a more general version of the well-known oligopoly game of Cournot can be expressed in our model and all of the previously mentioned results apply to that as well.
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References
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© 2009 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Alaei, S., Malekian, A. (2009). An Analysis of Troubled Assets Reverse Auction. In: Leonardi, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5929. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_36
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10840-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-10841-9
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