Abstract
We develop an auction system that determines a fair number of komi for holding black stones in a GO game between two players of equal strength, and hence the right to the first move. It is modeled as a priority right pricing problem that demands for budget-balanced and egalitarian conditions, where a negative utility is associated with the losers. We establish results involved with the incentive compatible properties for this problem under both deterministic and randomized protocols.
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Deng, X., Qi, Q. (2009). Priority Right Auction for Komi Setting. In: Leonardi, S. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5929. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_51
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_51
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-10840-2
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