Abstract
We present a new insurance system for healthcare reform to meet the medical demand and alleviate the cost burden in China. China healthcare reform is complex where unlike most countries’ uniform system; it has two branches: urban health insurance and new rural cooperative medical. The equity and efficiency of the two medical healthcare systems are discussed in this paper. We use multi-agent based computational mechanism design simulation to analyze the healthcare insurance’s coverage, service and treatment cost of the people. A summary of the recent medical healthcare reforms undertaken in China is also discussed. Research results indicate that our novel hybrid healthcare insurance system formed by merging parts of the two branches can improve equity without compromising efficiency.
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Liang, G., Yamaki, H., Sheng, H. (2009). Mechanism Design Simulation for Healthcare Reform in China. In: Yang, JJ., Yokoo, M., Ito, T., Jin, Z., Scerri, P. (eds) Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems. PRIMA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5925. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11161-7_39
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11161-7_39
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11160-0
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11161-7
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