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International Andrei Ershov Memorial Conference on Perspectives of System Informatics

PSI 2009: Perspectives of Systems Informatics pp 282–293Cite as

Cryptographic Protocols Analysis in Event B

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 5947))

Abstract

We consider the proof-based development of cryptographic protocols satisfying security properties. For instance, the model of Dolev-Yao provides a way to integrate a description of possible attacks, when designing a protocol. We use existing protocols and want to provide a systematic way to prove but also to design cryptographic protocols; moreover, we would like to provide proof-based guidelines or patterns for integrating cryptographic elements in an existing protocol. The goal of the paper is to present a first attempt to mix design patterns (as in software engineering) and formal methods (as a verification tool). We illustrate the technique on the well known Needham-Schroeder public key protocol and Blake-Wilson-Menezes key transport protocol. The underlying modelling language is Event B and is supported by the RODIN platform, which is used to validate models.

This work is supported by grant No. ANR-06-SETI-015-03 awarded by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Université Henri Poincaré Nancy 1 and LORIA, BP 239, 54506, Vandœuvre-lès-Nancy, France

    Nazim Benaissa & Dominique Méry

Authors
  1. Nazim Benaissa
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  2. Dominique Méry
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. (1941-2009), The Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel New York University, NY, USA

    Amir Pnueli

  2. Siberian Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences, A.P. Ershov Institute of Informatics Systems, 6, Acad. Lavrentiev pr., 630090, Novosibirsk, Russia

    Irina Virbitskaite

  3. Department of Computer Science, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9PL, Manchester, UK

    Andrei Voronkov

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Benaissa, N., Méry, D. (2010). Cryptographic Protocols Analysis in Event B. In: Pnueli, A., Virbitskaite, I., Voronkov, A. (eds) Perspectives of Systems Informatics. PSI 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5947. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11486-1_24

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11486-1_24

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11485-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11486-1

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