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Errors Matter: Breaking RSA-Based PIN Encryption with Thirty Ciphertext Validity Queries

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Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010 (CT-RSA 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNCS,volume 5985))

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Abstract

We show that one can recover the PIN from a standardized RSA-based PIN encryption algorithm from a small number of queries to a ciphertext validity checking oracle. The validity checking oracle required is rather special and we discuss whether such oracles could be obtained in the real world. Our method works using a minor extension to the ideas of Bleichenbacher and Manger, in particular we obtain information from negative, as well as positive, responses from the validity checking oracle.

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References

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Smart, N.P. (2010). Errors Matter: Breaking RSA-Based PIN Encryption with Thirty Ciphertext Validity Queries. In: Pieprzyk, J. (eds) Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010. CT-RSA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5985. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11925-5_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-11925-5_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-11924-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-11925-5

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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