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A User Interface for a Game-Based Protocol Verification Tool

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Formal Aspects in Security and Trust (FAST 2009)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 5983))

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Abstract

We present a platform that allows a protocol researcher to specify the sequence of games from an initial protocol to a protocol where the security property under consideration can be shown to hold using “conventional” means. Our tool represents the protocol in the form of a program dependency graph. A step in the sequence corresponds to replacing a local fragment in the current graph. The researcher interacts with the tool by pointing out the location of this fragment and choosing the applied transformation from a list. The tool guarantees the error-freeness of the sequence. By our knowledge, this is the first time where the aspects of user interaction have been seriously considered for a sequence-of-games-based protocol analyzer.

This research has been supported by Estonian Science Foundation, grant #6944, by the European Regional Development Fund through the Estonian Center of Excellence in Computer Science, EXCS, and by EU Integrated Project AEOLUS (contract no. IST-15964).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Cybernetica AS and Tartu University,  

    Peeter Laud

  2. Institute of Cybernetics at Tallinn University of Technology,  

    Ilja Tšahhirov

Authors
  1. Peeter Laud
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  2. Ilja Tšahhirov
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Informatica, Università di Pisa, Largo Bruno Pontecorvo, 3, 56127, Pisa, Italy

    Pierpaolo Degano

  2. The MITRE Corporation, 202 Burlington Rd, MS S128, MA 01730, Bedford, USA

    Joshua D. Guttman

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Laud, P., Tšahhirov, I. (2010). A User Interface for a Game-Based Protocol Verification Tool. In: Degano, P., Guttman, J.D. (eds) Formal Aspects in Security and Trust. FAST 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 5983. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_19

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_19

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12458-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12459-4

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