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Scratch, Click & Vote: E2E Voting over the Internet

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Towards Trustworthy Elections

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6000))

Abstract

We present Scratch, Click & Vote remote voting scheme. The scheme is end-to-end verifiable and allows for voting over the Internet. It guarantees security against malicious hardware and software used by a voter; a voter’s computer does not get any knowledge about the voter’s choice. Moreover, it can blindly change the voter’s ballot with a small probability only.

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Kutyłowski, M., Zagórski, F. (2010). Scratch, Click & Vote: E2E Voting over the Internet. In: Chaum, D., et al. Towards Trustworthy Elections. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6000. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_21

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_21

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12979-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12980-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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