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Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6000))

Abstract

In this paper, we develop methods for constructing vote-buying/coercion attacks on end-to-end voting systems, and describe vote-buying/coercion attacks on three proposed end-to-end voting systems: Punchscan, Prêt-à-voter, and ThreeBallot. We also demonstrate a different attack on Punchscan, which could permit corrupt election officials to change votes without detection in some cases. Additionally, we consider some generic attacks on end-to-end voting systems.

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Kelsey, J., Regenscheid, A., Moran, T., Chaum, D. (2010). Attacking Paper-Based E2E Voting Systems. In: Chaum, D., et al. Towards Trustworthy Elections. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6000. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_23

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12979-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12980-3

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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