Abstract
This article presents an ‘end-to-end’ integrity verification mechanism for use in minimally equipped secret paper-ballot election environments. The scheme presented in this paper achieves high integrity properties without interfering with the traditional marking and tabulation procedures of paper-ballot elections. Officials and auditors can respectively generate and independently verify ‘end-to-end’ audit trails, with office stationery and entirely without cryptographic or mathematic computations.
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Essex, A., Clark, J., Adams, C. (2010). Aperio: High Integrity Elections for Developing Countries. In: Chaum, D., et al. Towards Trustworthy Elections. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6000. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-12980-3_24
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-12979-7
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-12980-3
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