Abstract
We present Conqueror, a software-based attestation scheme for tamper-proof code execution on untrusted legacy systems. Beside providing load-time attestation of a piece of code, Conqueror also ensures run-time integrity. Conqueror constitutes a valid alternative to trusted computing platforms, for systems lacking specialized hardware for attestation. We implemented a prototype, specific for the Intel x86 architecture, and evaluated the proposed scheme. Our evaluation showed that, compared to competitors, Conqueror is resistant to static and dynamic attacks and that our scheme represents an important building block for realizing new security systems.
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Martignoni, L., Paleari, R., Bruschi, D. (2010). Conqueror: Tamper-Proof Code Execution on Legacy Systems. In: Kreibich, C., Jahnke, M. (eds) Detection of Intrusions and Malware, and Vulnerability Assessment. DIMVA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6201. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14215-4_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14215-4_2
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