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Empirical Hardness for Mixed Auctions

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 5988))

Abstract

Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) offer a high potential to be employed for the automated assembly of supply chains of agents. However, little is known about the factors making a winner determination problem (WDP) instance hard to solve. In this paper we empirically study the hardness of MMUCAs: (i) to build a model that predicts the time required to solve a WDP instance (because time can be an important constraint during an auction-based negotiation); and (ii) to assess the factors that make a WDP instance hard to solve.

Funded by projects IEA (TIN2006-15662-C02-01), AT (CSD2007-0022), EVE (TIN2009-14702-C02-01, TIN2009-14702-C02-02).

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References

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Almajano, P., Cerquides, J., Rodriguez-Aguilar, J.A. (2010). Empirical Hardness for Mixed Auctions. In: Meseguer, P., Mandow, L., Gasca, R.M. (eds) Current Topics in Artificial Intelligence. CAEPIA 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 5988. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14264-2_17

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14264-2_17

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-14263-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-14264-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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