Abstract
We consider the task of designing a truthful auction mechanism for CPU time scheduling problem. There are m commodities (time slots) T = {t 1, t 2, ...,t m } for n buyers I = {1,2,...,n}. Each buyer requires a number of time slots s i for its task. The valuation function of buyer i for a bundle of time slots T i is v i (T i ) = w i (m − t), where t is the last time slot in T i and |T i | = s i . The utility u i of buyer i is v i (T i ) − p(T i ). It is well-known that Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism gives the incentive to bid truthfully. Although optimal social welfare is computationally feasible in CPU time scheduling problem, VCG mechanism may produce low revenue. We design an auction which also maintains the incentives for bidders to bid truthfully. In addition, we perform simulations and observe that our truthful mechanism produces more revenue than VCG on average.
This work was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China [Project No. CityU 117408].
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Zhang, Q., Li, M. (2010). Truthful Auction for CPU Time Slots. In: Lee, DT., Chen, D.Z., Ying, S. (eds) Frontiers in Algorithmics. FAW 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6213. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14553-7_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14553-7_5
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