Security Mechanisms with Selfish Players in Wireless Networks

Abstract

It is frequently assumed that the parties involved in a security mechanism will behave according to everyone’s expectation. However, some of them might be tempted to depart from the expected (or canonical) behavior, because such a deviation is more beneficial for them. As an illustration, we will consider that phenomenon in the framework of wireless networks. We will briefly introduce some basic background in game theory and provide an overview of several recent contributions to that field. Finally, we will consider two examples in more detail, namely revocation in high-mobility (or “ephemeral”) networks and pseudonym change in mix zones.

Notes:

• Some of the material of this talk appears in the book “Security and Cooperation in Wireless Networks” by L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux, Cambridge University Press, 2008, available at http://secowinet.epfl.ch

• A list of applications of game theory to various security (and cryptography) problems can be found at: http://lca.epfl.ch/projects/gamesec