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International Workshop on Coordination, Organizations, Institutions, and Norms in Agent Systems

COIN 2009: Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems V pp 211–222Cite as

Effects of Social Network Topology and Options on Norm Emergence

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6069))

Abstract

A social norm is a behavior that emerges as a convention within society without any direction from a central authority. Social norms emerge as repeated interactions between individuals give rise to biases toward actions or behaviors which spread through the society until one behavior is adapted as the default behavior, even when multiple acceptable behaviors exist. Of particular interest to us is how and when norms emerge in social networks, which provide a framework for individuals to interact routinely. We study how quickly norms converge in social networks depending on parameters such as the topology of the network, population size, neighborhood size, and number of behavior alternatives. Our research can be used to model and analyze popular social networks on the Internet such as Facebook, Flickr, and Digg. In addition, it can be used to predict how norms emerge and spread in human societies, ranging from routine decisions like which side of the road to drive on to social trends such as the green phenomenon.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Oklahoma School of Science and Mathematics,  

    Onkur Sen

  2. Department of Computer Science, University of Tulsa,  

    Sandip Sen

Authors
  1. Onkur Sen
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  2. Sandip Sen
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science, University of Bath, BA2 7AY, BATH, UK

    Julian Padget

  2. Software & Knowledge Engineering Laboratory, National Centre for Scientific Research "Demokritos", Institute of Informatics & Telecommunications, 15310, Athens, Greece

    Alexander Artikis

  3. University of Aberdeen, UK

    Wamberto Vasconcelos

  4. Department of Computer Science, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK

    Kostas Stathis

  5. Computer Science, Universidade Federal Fluminente - UFF, Sao Domingos Niteroi, RJ, Brazil

    Viviane Torres da Silva

  6. Purdue University, 70907, West Lafayette, IN, USA

    Eric Matson

  7. Digital Enterprise Research Institute (DERI), IDA Business Park, Lower Dangan, National University of Ireland, Galway, Ireland

    Axel Polleres

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Sen, O., Sen, S. (2010). Effects of Social Network Topology and Options on Norm Emergence. In: Padget, J., et al. Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems V. COIN 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6069. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14962-7_14

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-14962-7_14

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-14961-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-14962-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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