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Abstract

We introduce the TAC Ad Auctions game (TAC/AA), a new game for the Trading Agent Competition. The Ad Auctions game investigates complex strategic issues found in real sponsored search auctions that are not captured in current analytical models. We provide an overview of TAC/AA, introducing its key features and design rationale. TAC/AA debuted in summer 2009, with the final tournament commencing in conjunction with the TADA-09 workshop.

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Jordan, P.R., Wellman, M.P. (2010). Designing an Ad Auctions Game for the Trading Agent Competition. In: David, E., Gerding, E., Sarne, D., Shehory, O. (eds) Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets. AMEC TADA 2009 2009. Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, vol 59. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15117-0_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-15117-0_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-15116-3

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