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Algorithmic Game Theory

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Volume Editors

Spyros Kontogiannis Lecturer University of Ioannina Department of Computer Science 45110 Ioannina, Greece E-mail: kontog@cs.uoi.gr

Elias Koutsoupias Professor National and Kapodistrian University of Athens Department of Informatics and Telecommunications Panepistimiopolis, Ilissia, 15784 Athens, Greece E-mail: elias@di.uoa.gr

Paul G. Spirakis Professor Patras University Research Academic Computer Technology Institute 26504 Rion-Patra, Greece E-mail: spirakis@cti.gr

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Preface

The present volume was devoted to the third edition of the International Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), an interdisciplinary scientific event intended to provide a forum for researchers as well as practitioners to exchange innovative ideas and to be aware of each other's efforts and results. SAGT 2010 took place in Athens, on October 18–20, 2010. The present volume contains all contributed papers presented at SAGT 2010 together with the distinguished invited lectures of Amos Fiat (Tel-Aviv University, Israel), and Paul Goldberg (University of Liverpool, UK). The two invited papers are presented at the beginning of the proceedings, while the regular papers follow in alphabetical order (by the authors' names).

In response to the call for papers, the Program Committee (PC) received 61 submissions. Among the submissions were four papers with at least one coauthor that was also a PC member of SAGT 2010. For these PC-coauthored papers, an independent subcommittee (Elias Koutsoupias, Paul G. Spirakis, and Xiaotie Deng) made the judgment, and eventually two of these papers were proposed for inclusion in the Scientific Program. For the remaining 57 (non-PC-coauthored) papers, the PC of SAGT 2010 conducted a thorough evaluation (at least 3, and on average 3.9 reviews per paper) and electronic discussion, and eventually selected 26 papers for inclusion in the Scientific Program.

An additional tutorial, "Games Played in Physics", was also provided in SAGT 2010, courtesy of the academic research network Algogames $(A\lambda\gamma\sigma\pi a\iota\gamma\nu\iota\sigma)$ of the University of Patras.

We wish to thank the creators of the EasyChair System, a free conference management system provided and supported by the group of Andrei Voronkov, which significantly assisted the work of the PC.

August 2010

Spyros Kontogiannis Elias Koutsoupias Paul G. Spirakis

Conference Organization

SAGT 2010 was organized jointly by the National & Kapodistrian University of Athens and the Research Academic Computer Technology Institute (CTI), in cooperation with the ACM Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce (ACM-SIGECOM), the European Association for Theoretical Computer Science (EATCS), and the academic research network Algogames $(A\lambda\gamma\sigma\pi a\iota\gamma\nu\iota\sigma)$ of the University of Patras.

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