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Weak Keys in RSA with Primes Sharing Least Significant Bits

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6151))

Abstract

Let N = p q be an LSBS-RSA modulus where primes p and q have the same bit-length and share the m least significant bits, and (p − 1, q − 1) = 2. Given (N, e) with \(e\in \mathbb{Z}_{\frac{\phi(N)}{4}}^*\) that satisfies \(e w+z\cdot 2^{2(m-1)} =0 \pmod{\phi(N)/4}\) with \(0<w\leq \frac{1}{9}\sqrt{\frac{\phi(N)}{e}}N^{\frac{1}{4}+\theta}\) and \(|z|\leq c\frac{e w}{\phi(N)}N^{\frac{1}{4}-\theta}\), we can find p and q in polynomial time. We show that the number of these weak keys e is at least \(N^{\frac{3}{4}+\theta-\varepsilon}\), where θ = m/log2 N, and there exists a probabilistic algorithm that can factor N in time \(O(N^{\frac{1}{4}-\theta+\varepsilon})\).

This research is partially supported by Project 973 (no: 2007CB807902) and the natural science foundation in Shandong province (no: Y2008A22) in China.

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Meng, X., Bi, J. (2010). Weak Keys in RSA with Primes Sharing Least Significant Bits. In: Bao, F., Yung, M., Lin, D., Jing, J. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6151. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_20

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_20

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16341-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16342-5

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