Abstract
SC2000 is a 128-bit block cipher with a user key of 128, 192 or 256 bits, which employs a total of 6.5 rounds if a 128-bit user key is used. It is a CRYPTREC recommended e-government cipher. In this paper we describe one 4.75-round differential characteristic with probability 2− 126 of SC2000 and thirty 4.75-round differential characteristics with probability 2− 127. Finally, we exploit these 4.75-round differentials to conduct a differential cryptanalysis attack on a 5-round reduced version of SC2000 when used with a 128-bit key. The attack suggests for the first time that the safety margin of SC2000 with a 128-bit key decreases below one and a half rounds.
The work was done when the author was with Royal Holloway, University of London (UK).
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References
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Lu, J. (2010). Differential Attack on Five Rounds of the SC2000 Block Cipher. In: Bao, F., Yung, M., Lin, D., Jing, J. (eds) Information Security and Cryptology. Inscrypt 2009. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6151. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16342-5_4
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