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Formal Modeling and Verification of Sensor Network Encryption Protocol in the OTS/CafeOBJ Method

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6415))

Abstract

Sensor Network Encryption Protocol (SNEP) is one of the secure building blocks of the SPINS Protocol Suite and provides data confidentiality, two-party data authentication and evidence of data freshness in a wireless sensor network. We have formally analyzed SNEP and a node-to-node key agreement protocol based on it, using the OTS/CafeOBJ method. Among other invariants, we have verified that the protocols possess the important security properties of authenticity and confidentiality of relevant message components. To our knowledge, we are the first to formally analyze SNEP using algebraic specification techniques.

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Ouranos, I., Stefaneas, P., Ogata, K. (2010). Formal Modeling and Verification of Sensor Network Encryption Protocol in the OTS/CafeOBJ Method. In: Margaria, T., Steffen, B. (eds) Leveraging Applications of Formal Methods, Verification, and Validation. ISoLA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6415. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16558-0_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16558-0_9

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-16557-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-16558-0

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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