Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

International Conference on Pairing-Based Cryptography

Pairing 2010: Pairing-Based Cryptography - Pairing 2010 pp 187–205Cite as

Ephemeral Key Leakage Resilient and Efficient ID-AKEs That Can Share Identities, Private and Master Keys

  • Conference paper

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6487))

Abstract

One advantage of identity-based (ID-based) primitives is the reduced overhead of maintaining multiple static key pairs and the corresponding certificates. However, should a party wish to participate in more than one protocol with the same identity (ID), say email address, the party has to share a state between distinct primitives which is contrary to the conventional key separation principle. Thus it is desirable to consider security of protocols when a public identity and a corresponding private key are utilized in different protocols.

We focus on authenticated key exchange (AKE) and propose a pair of two-party ID-based authenticate key exchange protocols (ID-AKE) that are secure even if parties use the same IDs, private keys and master keys to engage in either protocol. To our knowledge the only ID-AKE protocol formally resilient to ephemeral key leakage is due to Huang and Cao (the HC protocol), where a party’s static key consists of two group elements. Our proposed protocols provide similar assurances and require a single group element both for static and ephemeral keys, and in that sense are optimal. From an efficiency perspective, they have the same number of pairing computations as the HC protocol. The security of all these protocols is established in the random oracle.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Entity authentication and key distribution. In: Stinson, D.R. (ed.) CRYPTO 1993. LNCS, vol. 773, pp. 232–249. Springer, Heidelberg (1994); Full version available at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/eakd-abstract.html

    Google Scholar 

  2. Blake-Wilson, S., Johnson, D., Menezes, A.: Key agreement protocols and their security analysis. In: Darnell, M. (ed.) Cryptography and Coding 1997. LNCS, vol. 1355, pp. 30–45. Springer, Heidelberg (1997)

    Google Scholar 

  3. Boneh, D., Franklin, M.: Identity-based encryption from the weil pairing. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 213–229. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  4. Boyd, C., Choo, K.-K.R.: Security of two-party identity-based key agreement. In: Dawson, E., Vaudenay, S. (eds.) MYCRYPT 2005. LNCS, vol. 3715, pp. 229–243. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  5. Boyd, C., Cliff, Y., González Nieto, J.M., Paterson, K.: Efficient one-round key exchange in the standard model. In: Mu, Y., Susilo, W., Seberry, J. (eds.) ACISP 2008. LNCS, vol. 5107, pp. 69–83. Springer, Heidelberg (2008); Full version available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/007/

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  6. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Analysis of key-exchange protocols and their use for building secure channels. In: Pfitzmann, B. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2001. LNCS, vol. 2045, pp. 453–474. Springer, Heidelberg (2001); Full version available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2001/040/

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  7. Canetti, R., Krawczyk, H.: Universally composable notions of key exchange and secure channels. In: Knudsen, L. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2002. LNCS, vol. 2332, pp. 337–351. Springer, Heidelberg (2002)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  8. Chatterjee, S., Hankerson, D., Knapp, E., Menezes, A.: Comparing two pairing-based aggregate signature schemes. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 55(2), 141–167 (2010)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  9. Chatterjee, S., Menezes, A., Ustaoğlu, B.: Reusing static keys in key agreement protocols. In: Roy, B., Sendrier, N. (eds.) INDOCRYPT 2009. LNCS, vol. 5922, pp. 39–56. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  10. Chen, L., Cheng, Z., Smart, N.P.: Identity-based key agreement protocols from pairings. International Journal of Information Security 6(4), 213–241 (2007)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. Diffie, W., Hellman, M.E.: New directions in cryptography. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory IT-22(6), 644–654 (1976)

    Article  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  12. González Vasco, M.I., Hess, F., Steinwandt, R.: Combined (identity-based) public key schemes. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/466 (2008), http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/466

  13. Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., Scott, M.: Software implementation of pairings. In: Joye, M., Neven, G. (eds.) Identity-Based Cryptography. Cryptology and Information Security, vol. 2, ch. XII, pp. 188–206. IOS Press, Amsterdam (2008)

    Google Scholar 

  14. Huang, H., Cao, Z.: An id-based authenticated key exchange protocol based on bilinear diffie-hellman problem. In: Safavi-Naini, R., Varadharajan, V. (eds.) ASIACCS 2009: Proceedings of the 2009 ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications Security, New York, NY, USA, pp. 333–342 (2009)

    Google Scholar 

  15. Kelsey, J., Schneier, B., Wagner, D.: Protocol interactions and the chosen protocol attack. In: Christianson, B., Crispo, B., Lomas, M., Roe, M. (eds.) SP 1997. LNCS, vol. 1361, pp. 91–104. Springer, Heidelberg (1998)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  16. Krawczyk, H.: HMQV: A high-performance secure Diffie-Hellman protocol. In: Cramer, R. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 546–566. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)

    Google Scholar 

  17. LaMacchia, B., Lauter, K., Mityagin, A.: Stronger security of authenticated key exchange. In: Susilo, W., Liu, J.K., Mu, Y. (eds.) ProvSec 2007. LNCS, vol. 4784, pp. 1–16. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  18. Menezes, A., Ustaoğlu, B.: Comparing the pre- and post-specified peer models for key agreement. International Journal of Applied Cryptography (IJACT) 1(3), 236–250 (2009)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  19. Menezes, A.J., Okamoto, T., Vanstone, S.A.: Reducing elliptic curve logarithms to logarithms in a finite field. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 39(5), 1639–1646 (1993)

    Article  MATH  MathSciNet  Google Scholar 

  20. NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology. Special Publication 800-56A, Recommendation for Pair-Wise Key Establishment Schemes Using Discrete Logarithm Cryptography (March 2007), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html

  21. Okamoto, E., Tanaka, K.: Key distribution system based on identification information. IEEE Journal on Selected Arean in Communications 7(4), 481–485 (1989)

    Article  Google Scholar 

  22. Sakai, R., Ohgishi, K., Kasahara, M.: Cryptosystems based on pairings. In: The 2000 Symposium on Cryptography and Information Security (2000)

    Google Scholar 

  23. Shamir, A.: Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In: Blakley, G.R., Chaum, D. (eds.) CRYPTO 1984. LNCS, vol. 196, pp. 47–53. Springer, Heidelberg (1984)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  24. Smart, N.P.: Identity-based authenticated key agreement protocol based on weil pairing. Electronic Letters 38(13), 630–632 (2002)

    Article  MATH  Google Scholar 

  25. Ustaoğlu, B.: Comparing SessionStateReveal and EphemeralKeyReveal for Diffie-Hellman protocols. In: Pieprzyk, J., Zhang, F. (eds.) ProvSec 2009. LNCS, vol. 5848, pp. 183–197. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. NTT Information Sharing Platform Laboratories, 3-9-11 Midori-cho, Musashino-shi, Tokyo, 180-8585, Japan

    Atsushi Fujioka, Koutarou Suzuki & Berkant Ustaoğlu

Authors
  1. Atsushi Fujioka
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Koutarou Suzuki
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. Berkant Ustaoğlu
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Technicolor, Security and Content Protection Labs, 1 avenue de Belle Fontaine, 35576, Cesson-Sévigné Cedex, France

    Marc Joye

  2. Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (JAIST), 923-1292, Nomi, Ishikawa, Japan

    Atsuko Miyaji

  3. National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technoloy (AIST), 101-0021, Tokyo, Japan

    Akira Otsuka

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

About this paper

Cite this paper

Fujioka, A., Suzuki, K., Ustaoğlu, B. (2010). Ephemeral Key Leakage Resilient and Efficient ID-AKEs That Can Share Identities, Private and Master Keys. In: Joye, M., Miyaji, A., Otsuka, A. (eds) Pairing-Based Cryptography - Pairing 2010. Pairing 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6487. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17455-1_12

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17455-1_12

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17454-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17455-1

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation