Abstract
We study online profit-maximizing auctions for digital goods with adversarial bid selection and uniformly random arrivals. Our goal is to design auctions that are constant competitive with \(\mathcal{F}^{(2)}\); in this sense our model lies at the intersection of prior-free mechanism design and secretary problems. We first give a generic reduction that transforms any offline auction to an online one, with only a loss of a factor of 2 in the competitive ratio; we then present some natural auctions, both randomized and deterministic, and study their competitive ratio; our analysis reveals some interesting connections of one of these auctions with RSOP, which we further investigate in our final section.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aggarwal, G., Fiat, A., Goldberg, A.V., Hartline, J.D., Immorlica, N., Sudan, M.: Derandomization of auctions. In: STOC, pp. 619–625 (2005)
Alaei, S., Malekian, A., Srinivasan, A.: On random sampling auctions for digital goods. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 187–196 (2009)
Babaioff, M., Immorlica, N., Kempe, D., Kleinberg, R.: Online auctions and generalized secretary problems. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2) (2008)
Balcan, M.-F., Blum, A., Hartline, J.D., Mansour, Y.: Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 74(8), 1245–1270 (2008)
Bar-Yossef, Z., Hildrum, K., Wu, F.: Incentive-compatible online auctions for digital goods. In: SODA, pp. 964–970 (2002)
Blum, A., Hartline, J.D.: Near-optimal online auctions. In: SODA, pp. 1156–1163 (2005)
Blum, A., Kumar, V., Rudra, A., Wu, F.: Online learning in online auctions. Theor. Comput. Sci. 324(2-3), 137–146 (2004)
Dhangwatnotai, P., Roughgarden, T., Yan, Q.: Revenue maximization with a single sample. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 129–138 (2010)
Feige, U., Flaxman, A.D., Hartline, J.D., Kleinberg, R.D.: On the competitive ratio of the random sampling auction. In: Deng, X., Ye, Y. (eds.) WINE 2005. LNCS, vol. 3828, pp. 878–886. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Goldberg, A.V., Hartline, J.D., Karlin, A.R., Wright, A., Saks, M.: Competitive auctions. In: Games and Economic Behavior, pp. 72–81 (2002)
Hajiaghayi, M.T., Kleinberg, R.D., Parkes, D.C.: Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 71–80 (2004)
Hartline, J.D., McGrew, R.: From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 175–182 (2005)
Hartline, J.D., Roughgarden, T.: Optimal mechanism design and money burning. In: STOC, pp. 75–84 (2008)
Hartline, J.D., Roughgarden, T.: Simple versus optimal mechanisms. In: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 225–234 (2009)
Lavi, R., Nisan, N.: Competitive analysis of incentive compatible on-line auctions. In: Proc. 2nd ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce (EC 2000), pp. 233–241 (2000)
Myerson, R.B.: Optimal auction design. Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science (December 1978)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2010 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Koutsoupias, E., Pierrakos, G. (2010). On the Competitive Ratio of Online Sampling Auctions. In: Saberi, A. (eds) Internet and Network Economics. WINE 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6484. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_27
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17571-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17572-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)