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Combined Side-Channel Attacks

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Book cover Information Security Applications (WISA 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6513))

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Abstract

The literature about side-channel attacks is very rich. Many side-channel distinguishers have been devised and studied; in the meantime, many different side-channels have been identified. Also, it has been underlined that the various samples garnered during the same acquisition can carry complementary information. In this context, there is an opportunity to study how to best combine many attacks with many leakages from different sources or using different samples from a single source. This problematic has been evoked as an open issue in recent articles. In this paper, we bring two concrete answers to the attacks combination problem. First of all, we experimentally show that two partitionings can be constructively combined. Then, we explore the richness of electromagnetic curves to combine several timing samples in such a way a sample-adaptative model attack yields better key recovery success rates than a mono-model attack using only a combination of samples (via a principal component analysis).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Département COMELEC, Institut TELECOM / TELECOM ParisTech, CNRS LTCI (UMR 5141), 46 rue Barrault, Paris Cedex 13, 75 634, France

    M. Abdelaziz Elaabid, Olivier Meynard, Sylvain Guilley & Jean-Luc Danger

  2. Équipe MTII, Laga, Université de Paris 8, 2 rue de la liberté, Saint-Denis Cedex, 93 526, France

    M. Abdelaziz Elaabid

  3. DGA/MI (CELAR), La Roche Marguerite, 35 174, Bruz, France

    Olivier Meynard

  4. Secure-IC S.A.S., 37/39 rue Dareau, 75 014, Paris, France

    Sylvain Guilley & Jean-Luc Danger

Authors
  1. M. Abdelaziz Elaabid
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  2. Olivier Meynard
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  3. Sylvain Guilley
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  4. Jean-Luc Danger
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer and Information Science, Korea University, Chungnam-do, Korea

    Yongwha Chung

  2. Computer Science Department, Google Inc. and Columbia University, NewYork, USA

    Moti Yung

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Elaabid, M.A., Meynard, O., Guilley, S., Danger, JL. (2011). Combined Side-Channel Attacks. In: Chung, Y., Yung, M. (eds) Information Security Applications. WISA 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6513. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17955-6_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-17955-6_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-17954-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-17955-6

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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