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Revisiting the Security of the Alred Design

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Information Security (ISC 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6531))

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Abstract

The Alred construction is a lightweight strategy for constructing Message Authentication Codes (MACs). Although its original analysis shows that this construction is secure against attacks not involving internal collisions, it is unclear if the same is valid in a more generic scenario. In this paper, we complement that analysis, showing that one can expect a reasonable security level even when attackers try to explore such collisions. More specifically, we use the game-playing technique to formally evaluate the security of one Alred instance, Marvin, bounding its security in a quantitative manner; the security analysis is in the concrete-security paradigm. We then show how the concepts involved can be used in the analysis of Pelican, which follows the same design principles.

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Simplício, M.A., Barreto, P.S.L.M., Carvalho, T.C.M.B. (2011). Revisiting the Security of the Alred Design. In: Burmester, M., Tsudik, G., Magliveras, S., Ilić, I. (eds) Information Security. ISC 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6531. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18178-8_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-18177-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-18178-8

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