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On the Profitability of Incompetence

  • Conference paper
Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XI (MABS 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNAI,volume 6532))

Abstract

The exchange of information is in many multi-agent systems the essential form of interaction. For this reason, it is crucial to keep agents from providing unreliable information. However, agents that provide information have to balance between being highly competent, in order to achieve a good reputation as information provider, and staying incompetent, in order to minimize the costs of information acquisition. In this paper, we use a multi-agent simulation to identify conditions under which it is profitable for agents either to make an investment to become competent, or to economize and stay incompetent. We focus on the case where the quality of the acquired information cannot objectively be assessed in any immediate way and where hence the information end users have to rely on secondary methods for assessing the quality of the information itself, as well as the trustworthiness of those who provide it.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Science, Technology and Communication, University of Luxembourg, L–1359, Luxembourg

    Eugen Staab & Martin Caminada

Authors
  1. Eugen Staab
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  2. Martin Caminada
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Faculty of Sciences, Department of Artificial Intelligence, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081a,, 1081 HV, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Tibor Bosse

  2. Krasnow Institute for Advanced Study, Center for Social Complexity, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, MS 6B2, 22030, Fairfax, VA, USA

    Armando Geller

  3. Department of Mediametics, Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, Delft University of Technology, Mekelweg 4, 2628, Delft, CD, The Netherlands

    Catholijn M. Jonker

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Staab, E., Caminada, M. (2011). On the Profitability of Incompetence. In: Bosse, T., Geller, A., Jonker, C.M. (eds) Multi-Agent-Based Simulation XI. MABS 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science(), vol 6532. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18345-4_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-18345-4_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-18344-7

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-18345-4

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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