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Security Improvement on a Group Key Exchange Protocol for Mobile Networks

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Computational Science and Its Applications - ICCSA 2011 (ICCSA 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6785))

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Abstract

A group key exchange (GKE) protocol is designed to allow a group of parties communicating over a public network to establish a common secret key called a session key. As group-oriented applications gain popularity over the Internet, a number of GKE protocols have been suggested to provide those applications with a secure multicast channel. Among the many protocols is the GKE protocol presented by Dutta and Dowling for mobile ad hoc networks. In this paper, we are concerned with the security of the Dutta-Dowling protocol. Their protocol carries a proof of security in the standard adversarial model which captures unknown key-share attacks. But unlike the claim of provable security, the Dutta-Dowling protocol fails to achieve unknown key-share resilience. We here reveal this security vulnerability of the protocol and show how to address it.

This work was supported by Priority Research Centers Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (2010-0020210).

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Nam, J., Lee, K., Paik, J., Paik, W., Won, D. (2011). Security Improvement on a Group Key Exchange Protocol for Mobile Networks. In: Murgante, B., Gervasi, O., Iglesias, A., Taniar, D., Apduhan, B.O. (eds) Computational Science and Its Applications - ICCSA 2011. ICCSA 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6785. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21898-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-21898-9_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-21897-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-21898-9

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