Abstract
There have been significant advances in recent years in the development of highassurance voting systems [1,2,3,4]. However, despite formal proofs of the technical core of such protocols, wider analysis continues to throw up a remarkable array of threats and attacks against voting systems, many non-technical [5,6].
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Ryan, P.Y.A. (2011). Remodelling the Attacker in Voting Protocols. In: Christianson, B., Malcolm, J.A., Matyas, V., Roe, M. (eds) Security Protocols XVI. Security Protocols 2008. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6615. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22137-8_31
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22137-8_31
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