Abstract
We use the Universally Composable (UC) framework to evaluate our Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) protocol for verifying the validity of the ballot in an Internet voting scheme. We first describe the Internet voting scheme followed by the explanation of the NIZK protocol for ballot verification in that voting scheme. We then define the ideal functionalities using the UC framework and evaluate the NIZK protocol by using these ideal functionalities. We find that this NIZK protocol is secure in the UC framework in the presence of malicious and adaptive adversaries.
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Based, M.A., Mjølsnes, S.F. (2011). Universally Composable NIZK Protocol in an Internet Voting Scheme. In: Cuellar, J., Lopez, J., Barthe, G., Pretschner, A. (eds) Security and Trust Management. STM 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6710. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22444-7_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22444-7_10
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