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E-Voting: A New Approach Using Double-Blind Identity-Based Encryption

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Public Key Infrastructures, Services and Applications (EuroPKI 2010)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 6711))

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Abstract

We present a new cryptographic construction, double-blind identity-based encryption (DB-IBE). In standard IBE, the identity string that is passed to a key generation centre (\(\mathcal{KGC}\) ) during the key extraction phase is visible to the \(\mathcal{KGC}\) . Recent work introduced the idea of blinding the identity string, resulting in a blind IBE scheme which obscures the identity string from a \(\mathcal{KGC}\) . Double-blind IBE schemes, which are extensions of blind IBE schemes, allow a user to construct an identity string that is partially obscured from the \(\mathcal{KGC}\) , while also facilitating the \(\mathcal{KGC}\) adding elements to the identity string which are obscured from the user. Using DB-IBE, we present an e-voting scheme with desirable features such as universal verifiability, voter verifiability and receipt-freeness.

The authors thank Science Foundation Ireland (SFI) for support under grant 08/RFP/CMS1347.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computing, Dublin City University, Glasnevin, Dublin 9, Ireland

    David Gray & Caroline Sheedy

Authors
  1. David Gray
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  2. Caroline Sheedy
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. IBM Research - Zurich, Saumerstrasse 4, 8803, Rueschlikon, Switzerland

    Jan Camenisch

  2. University of Piraeus, Department of Digital Systems, 18532, Piraeus, Greece

    Costas Lambrinoudakis

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Gray, D., Sheedy, C. (2011). E-Voting: A New Approach Using Double-Blind Identity-Based Encryption. In: Camenisch, J., Lambrinoudakis, C. (eds) Public Key Infrastructures, Services and Applications. EuroPKI 2010. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6711. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22633-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22633-5_7

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-22632-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22633-5

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