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International Conference on Electronic Government and the Information Systems Perspective

EGOVIS 2011: Electronic Government and the Information Systems Perspective pp 370–385Cite as

Verifiable Encrypted Redundancy for Mix-Type Remote Electronic Voting

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNISA,volume 6866))

Abstract

In this paper we present a mix-type remote electronic voting system belonging to the “proof of product with redundancy” paradigm. Votes are composed using a redundancy system that permits to prove the correct composition and plaintext awareness of votes at vote reception and check the validity of the mixing operation while preventing some privacy or denial of service attacks that were possible in previous proposals in the literature.

The authors acknowledge partial support by the Spanish Government under projects MTM2010-21580-C02-01 and CSD2007-0004, and by the Government of Catalonia under grant 2009SGR-442.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics, Universitat de Lleida, C. Jaume II 69, E-25001, Lleida, Spain

    Víctor Mateu, Josep M. Miret & Francesc Sebé

Authors
  1. Víctor Mateu
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  2. Josep M. Miret
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  3. Francesc Sebé
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Applied ICT (CAICT) and Copenhagen Business School (CBS), Howitzvej 60, 2000, Frederiksberg, Denmark

    Kim Normann Andersen

  2. Institute of Legal Information, Theory and Techniques, ITTIG-CNR, Italian National Reserach Council, Via de’ Barucci 20, 50127, Florence, Italy

    Enrico Francesconi

  3. ESI/Informatics, Örebro University, 701 82, Örebro, Sweden

    Åke Grönlund

  4. Faculty of Law, Leibniz Center for Law, University of Amsterdam, Kloveniersburgwal 48, 1000BA, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    Tom M. van Engers

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Mateu, V., Miret, J.M., Sebé, F. (2011). Verifiable Encrypted Redundancy for Mix-Type Remote Electronic Voting. In: Andersen, K.N., Francesconi, E., Grönlund, Å., van Engers, T.M. (eds) Electronic Government and the Information Systems Perspective. EGOVIS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6866. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22961-9_29

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-22961-9_29

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-22960-2

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-22961-9

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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