Abstract
Aiming at the main problem that the link between the formal definition of multilevel security and security goal is not always clear, we propose a new definition of multilevel security closer to the practical application. Due to the fact that separability property based on the construction of covert channels is not practical, we introduce the concept of trusted domain to the theoretical framework initiated by the characteristics of transitive and intransitive security policy. Following that two intuitive propositions with the corresponding proof are proposed.
This work is partially supported by National Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 61063039 & 11061004) and Natural Science Foundation of Guangxi Province in China (Grant No. 2010GXNSFB013052) and Scientific Research Fund of School of Mathematics and Computer of Guangxi University for nationalities.
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Huang, Y., Pan, X. (2011). The Research on Definition of Multilevel Security Based on the Construction of Covert Channels. In: Zhang, J. (eds) Applied Informatics and Communication. ICAIC 2011. Communications in Computer and Information Science, vol 227. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23226-8_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-23226-8_21
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-23225-1
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-23226-8
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