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Game Theoretical Aspects in Modeling and Analyzing the Shipping Industry

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Computational Logistics (ICCL 2011)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 6971))

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Abstract

The shipping industry is known for providing transport service in terms of deploying vessels and accessing ports, making shipping one of the network-based services. From the perspective of traditional as well as neo-economics, shipping is assumed to pursue profit maximization subject to scarce resources, e.g. capital, assets, seafarers, or binding constraints derived from schedules, etc. Players could be any of the following: linkage operators, e.g. liner shipping carriers, port operators, freight forwarders, customs, hinterland haulage carriers, inland navigation carriers, market regulators, etc. Taking into account interdependencies and inter-relations, game theory provides a meaningful way to model and analyze behaviors of the involved players. In this paper we provide a survey on game theoretical approaches within the shipping industry.

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  1. Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai, 200240, P.R. China

    Xiaoning Shi

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  1. Xiaoning Shi
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  2. Stefan Voß
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  1. Institute of Maritime Logistics, University of Technology, Schwarzenbergstraße 95 (D), 21073, Hamburg, Germany

    Jürgen W. Böse  & Carlos Jahn  & 

  2. School of Naval Architecture, Ocean and Civil Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Dongchuan Road 800, 200240, Shanghai, China

    Hao Hu  & Xiaoning Shi  & 

  3. Institute of Information Systems, University of Hamburg, Von-Melle-Park 5, 20146, Hamburg, Germany

    Robert Stahlbock  & Stefan Voß  & 

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Shi, X., Voß, S. (2011). Game Theoretical Aspects in Modeling and Analyzing the Shipping Industry. In: Böse, J.W., Hu, H., Jahn, C., Shi, X., Stahlbock, R., Voß, S. (eds) Computational Logistics. ICCL 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 6971. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24264-9_23

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-24264-9_23

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