Abstract
Attack–defense trees extend attack trees with defense nodes. This richer formalism allows for a more precise modeling of a system’s vulnerabilities, by representing interactions between possible attacks and corresponding defensive measures. In this paper we compare the computational complexity of both formalisms. We identify semantics for which extending attack trees with defense nodes does not increase the computational complexity. This implies that, for these semantics, every query that can be solved efficiently on attack trees can also be solved efficiently on attack–defense trees. Furthermore, every algorithm for attack trees can directly be used to process attack–defense trees.
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Kordy, B., Pouly, M., Schweitzer, P. (2012). Computational Aspects of Attack–Defense Trees. In: Bouvry, P., Kłopotek, M.A., Leprévost, F., Marciniak, M., Mykowiecka, A., Rybiński, H. (eds) Security and Intelligent Information Systems. SIIS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7053. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25261-7_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25261-7_8
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