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Cryptanalysis of a Provably Secure Cross-Realm Client-to-Client Password-Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol of CANS ’09

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7092))

Abstract

In this paper, we cryptanalyze the recent smart card based client-to-client password-authenticated key agreement (C2C-PAKA-SC) protocol for cross-realm settings proposed at CANS ’09. While client-to-client password-authenticated key exchange (C2C-PAKE) protocols exist in literature, what is interesting about this one is that it is the only such protocol claimed to offer security against password compromise impersonation without depending on public-key cryptography, and is one of the few C2C-PAKE protocols with provable security that has not been cryptanalyzed. We present three impersonation attacks on this protocol; the first two are easier to mount than the designer-considered password compromise impersonation. Our results are the first known cryptanalysis results on C2C-PAKA-SC.

Research partially funded by the Ministry of Science, Technology & Innovation (MOSTI) under grant no. MOSTI/BGM/R&D/500-2/8.

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Yau, WC., Phan, R.C.W., Goi, BM., Heng, SH. (2011). Cryptanalysis of a Provably Secure Cross-Realm Client-to-Client Password-Authenticated Key Agreement Protocol of CANS ’09. In: Lin, D., Tsudik, G., Wang, X. (eds) Cryptology and Network Security. CANS 2011. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7092. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25513-7_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25513-7_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-25512-0

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