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Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference

CT-RSA 2012: Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2012 pp 156–170Cite as

A First-Order Leak-Free Masking Countermeasure

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7178))

Abstract

One protection of cryptographic implementations against side-channel attacks is the masking of the sensitive variables. In this article, we present a first-order masking that does not leak information when the registers change values according to some specific (and realistic) rules. This countermeasure applies to all devices that leak a function of the distance between consecutive values of internal variables. In particular, we illustrate its practicality on both hardware and software implementations.

Moreover, we introduce a framework to evaluate the soundness of the new first-order masking when the leakage slightly deviates from the rules involved to design the countermeasure. It reveals that the countermeasure remains more efficient than the state-of-the-art first-order masking if the deviation from the ideal model is equal to a few tens of percents, and that it is as good as a first-order Boolean masking even if the deviation is 50%.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Crypto Group, TELECOM-ParisTech, 37/39 rue Dareau, 75 634, Paris Cedex 13, France

    Houssem Maghrebi, Sylvain Guilley & Jean-Luc Danger

  2. Oberthur Technologies, 71-73, rue des Hautes Pâtures, 92726, Nanterre Cedex, France

    Emmanuel Prouff

  3. Secure-IC S.A.S., 2 rue de la Châtaigneraie, 35 576, Cesson Sevigné, France

    Sylvain Guilley & Jean-Luc Danger

Authors
  1. Houssem Maghrebi
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  2. Emmanuel Prouff
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  3. Sylvain Guilley
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  4. Jean-Luc Danger
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Computer Science Department, University of Haifa, 31905, Haifa, Israel

    Orr Dunkelman

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Maghrebi, H., Prouff, E., Guilley, S., Danger, JL. (2012). A First-Order Leak-Free Masking Countermeasure. In: Dunkelman, O. (eds) Topics in Cryptology – CT-RSA 2012. CT-RSA 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7178. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27954-6_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-27954-6_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-27953-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-27954-6

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