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A Code-Based 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer Based on McEliece Assumptions

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Information Security Practice and Experience (ISPEC 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7232))

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an efficient code-based 1-out-of-N oblivious transfer, \(OT_1^N\), based on McEliece assumptions without invoking the \(OT_1^2\) several times as in the paradigm proposed in [20,6]. We also show that the protocol is computationally secure against passive and active adversaries. To our knowledge, this is the first practical code-based \(OT_1^N\) protocol. The proposed protocol is compared with some existing number-theoretic \(OT_1^N\) protocols for efficiency.

Also, the passively secure 1-out-of-2 OT protocol proposed by Dowsley et al. [10] is reviewed. A formal argument of the computational security of the protocol against active adversaries is furnished.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Theoretical Computer Science Lab, Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Madras, India

    Preetha Mathew K. & C. Pandu Rangan

  2. Department of Mathematics and Computer Applications, PSG College of Technology, Coimbatore, India

    Sachin Vasant & Sridhar Venkatesan

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  1. Preetha Mathew K.
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  2. Sachin Vasant
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  3. Sridhar Venkatesan
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  4. C. Pandu Rangan
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

    Mark D. Ryan

  2. Toshiba Corporation, 1, Komukai-Toshiba–Cho, 212-8582, Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki, Japan

    Ben Smyth

  3. School of Computer Science & Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Guilin Wang

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K., P.M., Vasant, S., Venkatesan, S., Pandu Rangan, C. (2012). A Code-Based 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer Based on McEliece Assumptions. In: Ryan, M.D., Smyth, B., Wang, G. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7232. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29101-2_10

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29101-2_10

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29100-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29101-2

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