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International Conference on Information Security Practice and Experience

ISPEC 2012: Information Security Practice and Experience pp 80–96Cite as

New Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia

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Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNSC,volume 7232))

Abstract

Camellia is one of the most worldwide used block ciphers, which has been selected as a standard by ISO/IEC. In this paper, we propose several new 7-round impossible differentials of Camellia with 2 FL/FL − 1 layers, which turn out to be the first 7-round impossible differentials with 2 FL/FL − 1 layers. Combined with some basic techniques including the early abort approach and the key schedule consideration, we achieve the impossible differential attacks on 11-round Camellia-128, 11-round Camellia-192, 12-round Camellia-192, and 14-round Camellia-256, and the time complexity are 2123.8, 2121.7, 2171.4 and 2238.3 respectively. As far as we know, these are the best results against the reduced-round variants of Camellia. Especially, we give the first attack on 11-round Camellia-128 reduced version with FL/FL − 1 layers.

Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 60803125 and NO. 61133013), and the Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program(2009THZ01002).

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Computer Science and Technology, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China

    Dongxia Bai

  2. Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Leibo Li

  3. School of Mathematics, Shandong University, Jinan, 250100, China

    Leibo Li

Authors
  1. Dongxia Bai
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  2. Leibo Li
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Computer Science, University of Birmingham, UK

    Mark D. Ryan

  2. Toshiba Corporation, 1, Komukai-Toshiba–Cho, 212-8582, Saiwai-ku, Kawasaki, Japan

    Ben Smyth

  3. School of Computer Science & Software Engineering, University of Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, 2522, Wollongong, NSW, Australia

    Guilin Wang

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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

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Bai, D., Li, L. (2012). New Impossible Differential Attacks on Camellia. In: Ryan, M.D., Smyth, B., Wang, G. (eds) Information Security Practice and Experience. ISPEC 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7232. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29101-2_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29101-2_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-29100-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29101-2

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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