Abstract
This chapter reviews the techniques an attacker could employ to conduct a Differential Fault Analysis of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). Biham and Shamir proposed the first such attack on a block cipher based on the differential cryptanalysis of DES. This attack was later extended to permit an attack based on faults in the early or middle rounds of DES.
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Note that a one-bit differential in the input of a DES S-box cannot produce a zero differential in the output.
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Note that the \((p_i(\cdot ))_i\) distributions are almost independent of the secret key (this fact is argued in [47]).
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This definition slightly differs from the definition in [178].
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© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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Rivain, M. (2012). Differential Fault Analysis of DES. In: Joye, M., Tunstall, M. (eds) Fault Analysis in Cryptography. Information Security and Cryptography. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29656-7_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-29656-7_3
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Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
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Online ISBN: 978-3-642-29656-7
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