Abstract
N independent sources choose their provider depending on the perceived costs associated with each provider. The perceived cost is the sum of the price and quality of service proposed by the provider coefficiented by the source sensitivity to the quality of service. The source chooses the smallest cost provider or refuses to subscribe if all the perceived costs are above her maximum admissible opportunity cost. First, we detail the market segmentation between the providers as function of the quality of service sensitivity. Then, we prove that in case where coalitions emerged and under defensive equilibria, the game characteristic function would be submodular meaning that the Shapley value would be a fair and stable way to share the grand coalition revenue.
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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Barth, D., Cohen, J., Echabbi, L., Le Cadre, H. (2012). Coalition Stability under QoS Based-Market Segmentation. In: Jain, R., Kannan, R. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 75. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_27
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30372-2
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30373-9
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