Abstract
Spectrum scarcity is becoming a serious issue due to the rapid development of wireless communication technology. Dynamic spectrum sharing can effectively improve the spectrum usage by allowing secondary unlicensed users (SUs) to dynamically and opportunistically share the spectrum with primary licensed users (PUs). In this paper, we investigate a spectrum negotiation mechanism under incomplete information in a dynamic environment, where both the PU and the SU can obtain rate increases through cooperative communications. Specifically, an SU relays traffics for a PU in exchange for dedicated transmission time for the SU’s own communication needs. We model the bargaining process as dynamic Bayesian games and characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria under different system model parameters. Analysis and numerical results indicate that both PU and SU obtain performance improvements compared with no cooperation, and thus achieve a win-win situation via the spectrum negotiation.
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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering
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Yan, Y., Huang, J., Zhong, X., Wang, J. (2012). Dynamic Spectrum Negotiation with Asymmetric Information. In: Jain, R., Kannan, R. (eds) Game Theory for Networks. GameNets 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 75. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_36
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30373-9_36
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