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Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational

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Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications (AMMA 2011)

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Abstract

Consider a game played by two mountaineers climbing a mountain.Both are only interested in attaining the summit and can only reach it with help from the other. Over an infinite number of discrete periods they play a symmetric simultaneous game where they may either help the other a fixed distance up the mountain at some cost, or do nothing. Can these mountaineers climb their mountain?

Working paper available at: www.seas.harvard.edu/~mruberry/RationalBitTorrent2011.pdf

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 02138, USA

    Mike Ruberry & Sven Seuken

Authors
  1. Mike Ruberry
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  2. Sven Seuken
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Harvard Business School, Soldier Field Road, 2173, Boston, MA, USA

    Peter Coles

  2. Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110, 8th St, 12180-3590, Troy, NY, USA

    Sanmay Das

  3. Yahoo! Research, 111 West 40th St., 10018, New York, NY, USA

    Sébastien Lahaie

  4. Department of Computer Science, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, 110, 8th St., 12180, Troy, NY, USA

    Boleslaw Szymanski

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© 2012 ICST Institute for Computer Science, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering

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Ruberry, M., Seuken, S. (2012). Sharing in BitTorrent Can Be Rational. In: Coles, P., Das, S., Lahaie, S., Szymanski, B. (eds) Auctions, Market Mechanisms, and Their Applications. AMMA 2011. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol 80. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30913-7_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30912-0

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30913-7

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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