Abstract
Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a useful cryptographic primitive that allows two parties (client and server) to interact based on their respective (private) input sets, in such a way that client obtains nothing other than the set intersection, while server learns nothing beyond client set size. This paper considers one PSI construct from [DT10] and reports on its optimized implementation and performance evaluation. Several key implementation choices that significantly impact real-life performance are identified and a comprehensive experimental analysis (including micro-benchmarking, with various input sizes) is presented. Finally, it is shown that our optimized implementation of this RSA-OPRF-based PSI protocol markedly outperforms the one presented in [HEK12].
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Ateniese, G., De Cristofaro, E., Tsudik, G. (If) Size Matters: Size-Hiding Private Set Intersection. In: Catalano, D., Fazio, N., Gennaro, R., Nicolosi, A. (eds.) PKC 2011. LNCS, vol. 6571, pp. 156–173. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Aumann, Y., Lindell, Y.: Security Against Covert Adversaries: Efficient Protocols for Realistic Adversaries. In: Vadhan, S.P. (ed.) TCC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4392, pp. 137–156. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)
Baldi, P., Baronio, R., De Cristofaro, E., Gasti, P., Tsudik, G.: Countering gattaca: efficient and secure testing of fully-sequenced human genomes. In: CCS (2011), http://arxiv.org/abs/1110.2478
Belenkiy, M., Camenisch, J., Chase, M., Kohlweiss, M., Lysyanskaya, A., Shacham, H.: Randomizable Proofs and Delegatable Anonymous Credentials. In: Halevi, S. (ed.) CRYPTO 2009. LNCS, vol. 5677, pp. 108–125. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Bursztein, E., Lagarenne, J., Hamburg, M., Boneh, D.: OpenConflict: Preventing Real Time Map Hacks in Online Games. In: IEEE Security and Privacy (2011)
Bellare, M., Namprempre, C., Pointcheval, D., Semanko, M.: The one-more-RSA-inversion problems and the security of Chaum’s blind signature scheme. Journal of Cryptology 16(3) (2003)
Boneh, D.: Twenty years of attacks on the RSA cryptosystem. Notices of the AMS 46(2) (1998)
Camenisch, J.L., Michels, M.: Proving in Zero-Knowledge that a Number Is the Product of Two Safe Primes. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 107–122. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Camenisch, J.L., Shoup, V.: Practical Verifiable Encryption and Decryption of Discrete Logarithms. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 126–144. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
De Cristofaro, E., Jarecki, S., Liu, X., Lu, Y., Tsudik, G.: Automatic Privacy Protection Program – UC Irvine Team Web Site (2010), http://sprout.ics.uci.edu/projects/iarpa-app
De Cristofaro, E., Kim, J., Tsudik, G.: Linear-Complexity Private Set Intersection Protocols Secure in Malicious Model. In: Abe, M. (ed.) ASIACRYPT 2010. LNCS, vol. 6477, pp. 213–231. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Dachman-Soled, D., Malkin, T., Raykova, M., Yung, M.: Efficient Robust Private Set Intersection. In: Abdalla, M., Pointcheval, D., Fouque, P.-A., Vergnaud, D. (eds.) ACNS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5536, pp. 125–142. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
De Cristofaro, E., Tsudik, G.: Practical Private Set Intersection Protocols with Linear Complexity. In: Sion, R. (ed.) FC 2010. LNCS, vol. 6052, pp. 143–159. Springer, Heidelberg (2010), http://eprint.iacr.org/2009/491
De Cristofaro, E., Tsudik, G.: On the Performance of certain Private Set Intersection Protocols. Cryptology ePrint Archive (2012), http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/054
ElGamal, T.: A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 31(4) (1985)
Freedman, M.J., Ishai, Y., Pinkas, B., Reingold, O.: Keyword Search and Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) TCC 2005. LNCS, vol. 3378, pp. 303–324. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Fouque, P.-A., Kunz-Jacques, S., Martinet, G., Muller, F., Valette, F.: Power Attack on Small RSA Public Exponent. In: Goubin, L., Matsui, M. (eds.) CHES 2006. LNCS, vol. 4249, pp. 339–353. Springer, Heidelberg (2006)
Freedman, M.J., Nissim, K., Pinkas, B.: Efficient Private Matching and Set Intersection. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 1–19. Springer, Heidelberg (2004)
Goldreich, O., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S.: How to construct random functions. Journal of the ACM 33(4) (1986)
Huang, Y., Evans, D., Katz, J.: Private Set Intersection: Are Garbled Circuits Better than Custom Protocols. In: NDSS (2012)
Hazay, C., Lindell, Y.: Efficient Protocols for Set Intersection and Pattern Matching with Security Against Malicious and Covert Adversaries. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 155–175. Springer, Heidelberg (2008)
Hazay, C., Mikkelsen, G.L., Rabin, T., Toft, T.: Efficient rsa key generation and threshold paillier in the two-party setting. Cryptology ePrint Archive (2011), http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/494
Hazay, C., Nissim, K.: Efficient Set Operations in the Presence of Malicious Adversaries. In: Nguyen, P.Q., Pointcheval, D. (eds.) PKC 2010. LNCS, vol. 6056, pp. 312–331. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Ishai, Y., Kilian, J., Nissim, K., Petrank, E.: Extending Oblivious Transfers Efficiently. In: Boneh, D. (ed.) CRYPTO 2003. LNCS, vol. 2729, pp. 145–161. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)
Jarecki, S., Liu, X.: Efficient Oblivious Pseudorandom Function with Applications to Adaptive OT and Secure Computation of Set Intersection. In: Reingold, O. (ed.) TCC 2009. LNCS, vol. 5444, pp. 577–594. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Jarecki, S., Liu, X.: Fast Secure Computation of Set Intersection. In: Garay, J.A., De Prisco, R. (eds.) SCN 2010. LNCS, vol. 6280, pp. 418–435. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)
Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Introduction to modern cryptography. Chapman & Hall/CRC (2008)
Kissner, L., Song, D.: Privacy-Preserving Set Operations. In: Shoup, V. (ed.) CRYPTO 2005. LNCS, vol. 3621, pp. 241–257. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
Menezes, A., Oorschot, P.V., Vanstone, S.: Handbook of Applied Cryptography. CRC (1997)
Nagaraja, S., Mittal, P., Hong, C.Y., Caesar, M., Borisov, N.: BotGrep: Finding Bots with Structured Graph Analysis. In: Usenix Security (2010)
Naor, M., Pinkas, B.: Oblivious polynomial evaluation. SIAM Journal on Computing, 1–35(5) (2006)
Narayanan, A., Thiagarajan, N., Lakhani, M., Hamburg, M., Boneh, D.: Location Privacy via Private Proximity Testing. In: NDSS (2011)
Paillier, P.: Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residuosity Classes. In: Stern, J. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 1999. LNCS, vol. 1592, pp. 223–238. Springer, Heidelberg (1999)
Reed, S., Solomon, G.: Polynomial codes over certain finite fields. Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics 8(2) (1960)
Shamir, A.: How to Share a Secret. Communications of ACM 22(11) (1979)
Yao, A.C.: Protocols for secure computations. In: FOCS (1982)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
De Cristofaro, E., Tsudik, G. (2012). Experimenting with Fast Private Set Intersection. In: Katzenbeisser, S., Weippl, E., Camp, L.J., Volkamer, M., Reiter, M., Zhang, X. (eds) Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Trust 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7344. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30921-2_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30921-2_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30920-5
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30921-2
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)