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Experimenting with Fast Private Set Intersection

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Book cover Trust and Trustworthy Computing (Trust 2012)

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Abstract

Private Set Intersection (PSI) is a useful cryptographic primitive that allows two parties (client and server) to interact based on their respective (private) input sets, in such a way that client obtains nothing other than the set intersection, while server learns nothing beyond client set size. This paper considers one PSI construct from [DT10] and reports on its optimized implementation and performance evaluation. Several key implementation choices that significantly impact real-life performance are identified and a comprehensive experimental analysis (including micro-benchmarking, with various input sizes) is presented. Finally, it is shown that our optimized implementation of this RSA-OPRF-based PSI protocol markedly outperforms the one presented in [HEK12].

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De Cristofaro, E., Tsudik, G. (2012). Experimenting with Fast Private Set Intersection. In: Katzenbeisser, S., Weippl, E., Camp, L.J., Volkamer, M., Reiter, M., Zhang, X. (eds) Trust and Trustworthy Computing. Trust 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7344. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30921-2_4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-30921-2_4

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-30920-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-30921-2

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