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On Bidimensional Congestion Games

  • Conference paper
Book cover Structural Information and Communication Complexity (SIROCCO 2012)

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science ((LNTCS,volume 7355))

Abstract

We introduce multidimensional congestion games, that is, congestion games whose set of players can be partitioned into k + 1 clusters C 0,C 1,…,C k . Players in C 0 have full information about all the other participants in the game, while players in C i , for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, have full information only about the members of C 0 ∪ C i and are unaware of all the other ones. This model has at least two interesting applications: (i) it is a special case of graphical congestion games in which the game’s social knowledge graph is undirected and has independence number equal to k, and (ii) it models scenarios in which players may be of different types and the level of competition that each player experiences on a resource depends on the player’s type and on the types of the other players sharing the resource. We focus on the case in which k = 2 and the cost function associated with each resource is linear and show bounds on the prices of anarchy and stability for two different social functions.

This work was partially supported by the PRIN 2008 research project COGENT “Computational and game-theoretic aspects of uncoordinated networks” funded by the Italian Ministry of University and Research.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dipartimento di Matematica e Fisica “Ennio De Giorgi”, Università del Salento, Provinciale Lecce-Arnesano, P.O. Box 193, 73100, Lecce, Italy

    Vittorio Bilò

  2. Dipartimento di Ingegneria e Scienze dell’Informazione e Matematica, Università di L’Aquila, Via Vetoio, Loc. Coppito, 67100, L’Aquila, Italy

    Michele Flammini & Vasco Gallotti

Authors
  1. Vittorio Bilò
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  2. Michele Flammini
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  3. Vasco Gallotti
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. School of Electrical Engineering,, Tel-Aviv University, Ramat-Aviv, 69978, Tel Aviv, Israel

    Guy Even

  2. ICE-TCS School of Computer Science, Reykjavik University, 101, Reykjavik,, Iceland

    Magnús M. Halldórsson

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Bilò, V., Flammini, M., Gallotti, V. (2012). On Bidimensional Congestion Games. In: Even, G., Halldórsson, M.M. (eds) Structural Information and Communication Complexity. SIROCCO 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7355. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31104-8_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31104-8_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg

  • Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31103-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31104-8

  • eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)

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