Abstract
We study multiple keyword sponsored search auctions with budgets. Each keyword has multiple ad slots with a click-through rate. The bidders have additive valuations, which are linear in the click-through rates, and budgets, which are restricting their overall payments. Additionally, the number of slots per keyword assigned to a bidder is bounded.
We show the following results: (1) We give the first mechanism for multiple keywords, where click-through rates differ among slots. Our mechanism is incentive compatible in expectation, individually rational in expectation, and Pareto optimal. (2) We study the combinatorial setting, where each bidder is only interested in a subset of the keywords. We give an incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanism for identical click-through rates. (3) We give an impossibility result for incentive compatible, individually rational, Pareto optimal, and deterministic mechanisms for bidders with diminishing marginal valuations.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Aggarwal, G., Muthukrishnan, S., Pál, D., Pál, M.: General auction mechanism for search advertising. In: WWW 2009: Proceedings of the 18th International Conference on World Wide Web, pp. 241–250. ACM (2009)
Ashlagi, I., Braverman, M., Hassidim, A., Lavi, R., Tennenholtz, M.: Position auctions with budgets: Existence and uniqueness. The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics 10(1) (2010)
Ausubel, L.M.: An efficient ascending-bid auction for multiple objects. American Economic Review 94(5), 1452–1475 (2004)
Ausubel, L.M., Milgrom, P.R.: Ascending auctions with package bidding. Frontiers of Theoretical Economics 1(1), 1019 (2002)
Bhattacharya, S., Conitzer, V., Munagala, K., Xia, L.: Incentive compatible budget elicitation in multi-unit auctions. CoRR abs/0904.3501 (2009)
Bikhchandani, S., de Vries, S., Schummer, J., Vohra, R.V.: Ascending auctions for integral (poly)matroids with concave nondecreasing separable values. In: Teng, S.H. (ed.) SODA, pp. 864–873. SIAM (2008)
Dobzinski, S., Lavi, R., Nisan, N.: Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. In: FOCS, pp. 260–269. IEEE Computer Society (2008)
Dobzinski, S., Lavi, R., Nisan, N.: Multi-unit auctions with budget limits (2011), http://ie.technion.ac.il/~ronlavi/papers/budget-constraints.pdf
Dütting, P., Henzinger, M., Starnberger, M.: Auctions with heterogeneous items and budget limits (2012)
Dütting, P., Henzinger, M., Weber, I.: An expressive mechanism for auctions on the web. In: Srinivasan, S., Ramamritham, K., Kumar, A., Ravindra, M.P., Bertino, E., Kumar, R. (eds.) WWW, pp. 127–136. ACM (2011)
Edelman, B., Ostrovsky, M., Schwarz, M.: Internet advertising and the generalized second price auction: Selling billions of dollars worth of keywords. American Economic Review 97(1), 242–259 (2005)
Fiat, A., Leonardi, S., Saia, J., Sankowski, P.: Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets. In: Shoham, Y., Chen, Y., Roughgarden, T. (eds.) ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, pp. 223–232. ACM (2011)
Fujishige, S., Tamura, A.: A two-sided discrete-concave market with possibly bounded side payments: An approach by discrete convex analysis. Mathematics of Operations Research 32(1), 136–155 (2007)
Goel, G., Mirrokni, V.S., Leme, R.P.: Polyhedral clinching auctions and the adwords polytope. CoRR abs/1201.0404 (2012), to appear in 44th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC 2012), New York (May 2012)
Lavi, R., May, M.: A Note on the Incompatibility of Strategy-Proofness and Pareto-Optimality in Quasi-Linear Settings with Public Budgets - Working Paper. In: Chen, N., Elkind, E., Koutsoupias, E. (eds.) WINE 2011. LNCS, vol. 7090, p. 417. Springer, Heidelberg (2011)
Milgrom, P.: Putting auction theory to work: The simulteneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy 108(2), 245–272 (2000)
Nisan, N., Bayer, J., Chandra, D., Franji, T., Gardner, R., Matias, Y., Rhodes, N., Seltzer, M., Tom, D., Varian, H., Zigmond, D.: Google’s Auction for TV Ads. In: Albers, S., Marchetti-Spaccamela, A., Matias, Y., Nikoletseas, S., Thomas, W. (eds.) ICALP 2009, Part II. LNCS, vol. 5556, pp. 309–327. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)
Vickrey, W.: Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. The Journal of Finance 16(1), 8–37 (1961)
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2012 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
About this paper
Cite this paper
Colini-Baldeschi, R., Henzinger, M., Leonardi, S., Starnberger, M. (2012). On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets. In: Czumaj, A., Mehlhorn, K., Pitts, A., Wattenhofer, R. (eds) Automata, Languages, and Programming. ICALP 2012. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol 7392. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-31585-5_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
Print ISBN: 978-3-642-31584-8
Online ISBN: 978-3-642-31585-5
eBook Packages: Computer ScienceComputer Science (R0)